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Washington Title Insurers' Duty To Search And
Disclose
Formal land conveyancing methods have replaced those of
simpler days when sellers handed clumps of dirt or twigs to their
buyers while orally pronouncing the property transfer in their
neighbors' presence.1 Increasing complexities2 of modern real
estate transactions necessitated a system of title assurance to
reduce the possibility of title loss. Title insurance emerged when
modern society demanded not only a method to assure full
ownership in real property, but also a solvent assurer to answer
in damages if the assurance was incorrect.s Thus, state legisla-
tures initially required title insurers to demonstrate their sol-
vency by depositing substantial amounts of money in guaranty
funds as a condition of doing business." Some states have
imposed duties on title insurers in addition to demonstrated sol-
1. Neighbors, in case of a future dispute, would serve as jurors; therefore, buyers
would want them present at the conveyance. This transfer of a possessory estate in land,
called feoffment with livery of seisin, is the oldest English device for transferring prop-
erty. 6A R. PowELL, THE LAw OF RAL PROPERTY 1 879 (rev. ed. P. Rohan 1979).
2. The ancient English conveyance system in which sellers transferred land by oral
declaration (feoffment with livery) evolved into a system requiring written instruments
to effectuate land transfers. English vendors transferring land also transferred the origi-
nal deeds and instruments of title. The American system required not only written
instruments, but also registration of the documents. Thus, English vendors proved title
by reference to the transferred instruments of title; Americans, by reference to such
instruments in the public registry. Id. 881, 912. One authority describes the public
registry as a system of "extensive public records into which deeds, mortgages and an
increasing variety of other instruments are supposed to be incorporated." Id. 912. See
P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TrrLas § 3 (2d ed. 1970). Thus, real estate transactions are now
much more intricate and formal.
3. See Beasley, The Nature and Development of Title Insurance, in TTLE INSUR-
ANCE IN MAJOR REAL ESTATE TANSACTONS 13, 15 (PLI Real Estate Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 144, 1978). See generally Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66
YALE L.J. 492 (1957). Title insurance originated in 1876, when Pennsylvania's governor
granted conveyancers in that state a franchise to guarantee the accuracy of title exami-
nations and indemnify insureds against loss. Brossman & Rosenberg, Title Companies
And The Unauthorized Practice Rules: The Exclusive Domain Reexamined, 83 DICK. L.
Rav. 437, 444-46 (1979).
4. Washington, for instance, requires a $200,000 deposit for a county population of
500,000. WASH. Rzv. CODE § 48.29.030 (1979). California requires title companies to
maintain current assets of at least $10,000 in excess of current liabilities. CAL. INS. CODE
§ 12389(a)(2) (West Supp. 1980). See Johnstone, supra note 3, at 510-13.
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vency by requiring that insurers conduct reasonable searches5
for title defects6 and disclose the results to those relying on title
insurance in purchasing property. The Washington Supreme
Court, in contrast, has yet to impose this duty on Washington
title insurers. This comment proposes that Washington courts
impose on title insurers a duty, enforceable in tort, to conduct
reasonable searches and to disclose results to their insureds.
This comment, accordingly, explores possible non-statutory
sources of a title insurer's duty to search and disclose. After
reviewing the historical background of title insurance and com-
paring it with other title assurance methods, this comment
examines Washington case law, where the supreme court has
failed to impose the duty. It then considers the need to impose
and examines the theoretical bases of such a duty to search and
disclose: whether it should lie in tort or in contract. Finally, this
comment concludes that Washington courts should allow home
buyers to sue title insurers for negligence in failing to reasonably
search and disclose.
Historically, five title assurance methods exist in the United
States.' The oldest system is the lawyer's search of the public
records accompanied by an opinion or certificate indicating the
lawyer's conclusions as to the title's condition. This "lawyer's
opinion" method is now common only in New England and some
parts of southeastern states. A second system, the abstract
method, evolved from the lawyer's opinion method.10 When law-
5. Both courts and legislatures have imposed this duty. See, e.g., Banville v.
Schmidt, 37 Cal. App. 3d 92, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1974); Northwestern Title Sec. Co. v.
Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 85 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1970); Williams v. Polgar, 43 Mich. App. 95,
204 N.W.2d 57 (1972), affd, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
20-1567 (West 1975); COLO. Rzv. STAT. § 10-11-106 (1973). See text accompanying note
123 infra.
6. A title defect occurs "when the aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immu-
nities known as ownership is subject to the claims of others." Comment, Title Insurance:
The Duty to Search, 71 YALE L.J. 1161, 1161 (1962). Title defects may consist of party
walls, easements for public highways, outstanding leases, liens and charges against land
(mortgages, taxes, assessments, attachments, judgments, executions, mechanics' or ven-
dors' liens), dower or curtesy rights, restrictive covenants, encroachments, and ease-
ments. See cases collected at 77 Am. Jun. 2D Vendor and Purchaser §§ 190-254 (1975).
7. See text accompanying notes 43-61 infra.
8. For a more thorough discussion of the history of title insurance and the five
methods of title assurance, see Whitman, Optimizing Land Title Assurance Systems, 42
GEo. WASH. L. Rev. 40, 47-49 (1973).
9. Even in areas where the lawyer's search and opinion method prevails, some law-
yers use lay employees to conduct title searches. Id. at 47.
10. See Quiner, Title Insurance and the Title Insurance Industry, 22 DRAme L.
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yers realized their time and talents were not well utilized in con-
ducting laborious title searches, they hired lay employees to per-
form title searches and issued opinions or certificates based on
the information the employees obtained. The lay employees soon
envisioned a more lucrative business if they worked for more
than one lawyer, and with this realization came the formation of
commercial abstract companies using the abstract method. In
this method, currently used in several midwestern states, an
abstract company makes the search and issues an abstract of
title," which the lawyer examines before rendering an opinion. A
third method incorporates with title insurance either the
abstract system or the lawyer's opinion method. While the"commercial abstract plus title insurance" variety predominates
in midwestern states, the "lawyer's search plus title insurance"
is common in the Atlantic seaboard and southeastern states.1 2
This latter variety of title assurance is called the "approved
attorney" system because the title insurer relies on independent
lawyers rather than maintaining its own staff."3 A fourth
method, prevalent in Washington and other western states, 4 is
the title plant system: the issuance of title insurance after the
insurer conducts its own search and examination of records the
insurer itself privately owns and maintains. Finally, the Torrens
system assures proper title through a public official who, follow-
ing a judicial hearing upon the purchaser's application, certifies
REv. 711, 713 (1973).
11. An abstract is a book or file a layperson compiles after searching the records,
summarizing relevant findings. Id.; Whitman, supra note 8, at 47 n.36 ("an abstract is a
book or file containing summaries or full copies of all recorded instruments affecting
title"). See Raushenbush, Who Helps the Home Buyer?, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 203, 208,
where the author notes that under the abstract method, where abstracters rely on public
records which may be in error, abstracters may sue recording officials. Because lawyers
rely on the abstract, they may sue abstracters for error. Because buyers rely on lawyers,
who may erroneously evaluate abstracts, buyers may sue their lawyers.
12. Whitman, supra note 8, at 48.
13. Id. at 48 n.37. In the "approved attorney" system, the title insurer predicates
the policy on an independent lawyer's certificate: the policy therefore protects against
errors the examining lawyer may have made. Although the insured may sue the title
company if a nonexempt defect arises, the title company may in turn sue the lawyer if
failure to find or report such defect constitutes professional error. See Taub, Rights and
Remedies Under a Title Policy, in TITLE INSURANCE AND YOU: WHAT EVERY LAWYER
SHOULD KNOW! 69, 76-77 (ABA Section of Real Property, Probate & Trust Law ed. 1979).
See generally Payne, Title Insurance and the Unauthorized Practice of Law Contro-
versy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 423, 430 (1969).
14. Whitman, supra note 8, at 48. This self-search method predominates from the
Rockies to the Pacific and in Texas, Illinois, Michigan, New York, and Washington, D.C.
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the title and indemnifies losses resulting from errors."
Of these five systems, those that more adequately"6 protect
the public against lapses of the lawyer and abstracter are the
methods that incorporate title insurance.17 Thus, to understand
the genesis of title insurance, it is necessary to examine the
weaknesses of the abstract and lawyer's opinion methods which
title insurance sought to remedy. Both the lawyer's opinion and
abstract methods fail to provide adequate public protection.
First, when lawyers and abstracters rely on inefficient public
records" and grantor-grantee indices,'9 their search takes an
inordinate amount of time compared to a title plant company
search using superior recordkeeping and indexing systems.2 0 Sec-
15. Id. See Quiner, supra note 10, at 713-14 (noting the Torrens system's unpopu-
larity since the first U.S. Torrens legislation was enacted in 1897).
16. Title insurance also has many shortcomings. See text accompanying notes 35-41
infra. It is interesting that one authority refers to title insurers as title abstracters when
issuing a preliminary title report, 9 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5213,
at 50 (Supp. 1980), commenting that "it is well known that the policy has replaced the
title abstract." Id. § 5209, at 38 n.67.25.
17. Commentators describe the birth of title insurance in 1876 as a reaction to the
judicial limitation of conveyancer's (abstracter's) liability in the Pennsylvania case of
Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161, 98 Am. Dec. 213 (1868). The Watson defendant was a
lay conveyancer employed by the purchaser to determine whether certain property was
free of title defects. The defendant submitted an abstract of title to a lawyer and, in
reliance upon the lawyer's opinion, represented to the buyer that the land was free of
encumbrances. The buyer sued when an outstanding judgment clouded the title. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held for the defendant, concluding that a conveyancer does
not guarantee titles he reviews. Thus, the first title insurance company was formed by
"lawyers to protect the public against the non-liability of lay scriveners following...
Watson." Payne, supra note 13, at 431-32. See Brossman & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at
445-46 nn.30-32; Comment, supra note 6, at 1164 n.18.
18. Because public records are not centrally located, a title searcher must examine
several record offices, e.g., secretary of state, county auditor, clerk of court, and tax col-
lector. One company reported examining 76 sources of information in 16 public offices.
Whitman, supra note 8, at 46 n.25. See generally Quiner, supra note 10, at 713.
19. The grantor-grantee index traces chain of title based on names of grantees and
grantors; the tract index traces title based on tracts or parcels of land. Thus, the grantor-
grantee index is alphabetical, the tract index, numerical. See A. AXELROD, C. BERGER &
Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 553-55 (1971) [hereinafter cited as AxEL-
ROD]. Parcels of land are assigned separate pages in the tract indexing system. All trans-
actions affecting each parcel are noted on that page in the index. Note, The Tract and
Grantor-Grantee Indices, 47 IOWA L. RPv. 481, 481-82 (1962).
20. Most title insurers operate as title plant companies. A title plant maintains its
own records and tract indices. See Robinson, The Organization and Operation of Title
Plants, in AXELROD, supra note 19, at 600-04. Tract indices are more efficient because (1)
all recorded instruments affecting the parcels are compiled in one place and (2) the
searcher need not look at grantor-grantee indices (and, conversely, grantee-grantor indi-
ces to double check) where it would be especially burdensome, as in the case of a subdi-
vision. See Whitman, supra note 8, at 46 n.24; Comment, supra note 6, at 1164 & n.20.
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ond, if lawyers and abstracters fail to discover title defects fall-
ing outside the scope of a reasonable search, the client recovers
nothing.21 Title insurance emerged to remedy these problems; if
the defect was not excepted from coverage and not disclosed by
the title search, the insured could recover.22 Third, the lawyer's
opinion method could prove too costly for clients, particularly
when nonlawyers could be trained to conduct the searches.2
Fourth, even if a client could prove negligence on the part of the
lawyer or abstracter, the lawyer or abstracter might be insolvent.
The Torrens system also has many shortcomings. Because it
involves title registration with a court and a judicial hearing,
after which a public official issues a certificate of title, the cost is
greater than with other forms of title assurance. 2' Additionally,
in some instances, a land buyer using the Torrens system must
defend suits against the property and, in other circumstances,
must file a claim for indemnification in case a loss is suffered.2"
Inadequacy of guaranty funds is also a major problem with the
Torrens system.2' Because this title assurance method is based
upon a public official's certificate of title, a corrupt or incompe-
tent public official can deplete the indemnification fund and
destroy the stability of titles the Torrens system is intended to
foster.27 Title insurance companies, abstracters, and title exam-
ining lawyers opposed the Torrens system during the 1920's and
1930's, fearing that its general acceptance would put them out of
business.2 8 As a result, although legislatures could remedy many
of the Torrens system's shortcomings,' this method of title
The expediency and accuracy of both types of indices, however, are predicated on the
efficiency of the indexer.
21. See Brosaman & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 444-45. The standard of care for
lawyers and abstracters is to exercise reasonable care and skill in providing title informa-
tion. See text accompanying notes 145-47 infra.
22. Brossman & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 444-45.
23. Whitman, supra note 8, at 46.
24. See Quiner, supra note 10, at 713-14; Whitman, supra note 8, at 62-64.
25. Quiner, supra note 10, at 714.
26. Whitman, supro note 8, at 62 n.94 (one claim wiped out California's fund in
1937); see Axmaion, supra note 19, at 712-13 (Alberta legislature limited amount of
recovery resulting from register error).
27. Quiner, supra note 10, at 714 ("The thrust of this approach is that the certifi-
cate of title, compounded with the appropriate statutes of limitations, will become the
background of good and safe title.").
28. See Johnstone, supra note 3, at 513; Whitman, supra note 8, at 62 n.96.
29. One authority recommends a system of federal reinsurance to resolve the guar-
anty fund insufficiency problem; the use of an administrative agency, rather than judicial
registration, to lower costs of registering; and the use of existing title insurance policies
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assurance is rarely used.
Title insurance developed to provide benefits lacking in the
other title assurance systems. Insolvency may be a major defect
of the lawyer's opinion, the abstract, and the Torrens methods
of title assurance, and title insurance usually answers this prob-
lem by offering a solvent insurer to answer in damages for title
losses. 0 Further, unlike other providers of title assurance, most
title insurers provide legal defense for their insureds in suits
based upon a title defect within policy coverage. 1 Additionally,
title insurance coverage is unique because it extends to remote
or latent risks32 actuarially unlikely to result in losses.3 8 Finally,
the majority of title insurers, including Washington insurers,
operate as title plant companies and accordingly do not rely on
inefficient public records and indices in performing title
searches.84
Title insurance has drawbacks as well as benefits. An exami-
nation of a title insurance policy reveals one salient feature: title
insurers are not liable for most title defects disclosed by the
search. 5 Although title defects disclosed by the search as a gen-
eral rule are excepted specifically from policy coverage, title
insurance policies also contain general exceptions that relieve
the insurer of the necessity of searching for matters contained
and lawyer's certificates of title as the basic evidence for title registration. He also sug-
gests consolidation of title plants. Whitman, supra note 8, at 64-65. See generally P.
Basye, supra note 2, § 1.
30. See Johnstone, supra note 3, at 499. See generally Quiner, supra note 10, at 719,
721. Guaranty fund requirements contribute to title insurers' solvency.
31. See Johnstone, supra note 3, at 499-500.
32. Examples of such remote risks include recorded documents which appear to be
valid but are void because of forgery, improper execution, incapacity, impersonation, or a
transfer by one whose name differs from the record owner's. See Curtis, Title Assurance
in Sales of California Residential Realty: A Critique of Title Insurance and Title Cove-
nants with Suggested Reforms, 7 PAc. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1976); Johnstone, supra note 3, at 495-
96.
33. See Brossman & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 443; Johnstone, supra note 3, at
498; Quiner, supra note 10, at 719 ("lawyers [in contrast to insurers] have never been
sufficiently able to provide assurance from hidden risk"); Comment, supra note 6, at
1164.
34. Quiner, supra note 10, at 720; Comment, supra note 6, at 1164 & n.20.
35. See 0. BROWDER, R. CUNMNGHAM & J. JULIN, BAsIc PROPERTY LAW 953 (2d ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as BROWDER]; Johnstone, supra note 3, at 495-96 ("(Title insur-
ance] critics assert that title [insurers] are not ... insurers since they except any risks
apparent after the title has been examined."); Payne, supra note 13, at 439 (title insurers
exempt the very risks against which they are supposed to insure); Comment, supra note
6, at 1172 & n.61.
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therein.3 6 In the latter instance, the parties are not given notice
that potential defects exist and, consequently, executory buyers
prior to closing are unable to negotiate the risk of loss with their
sellers or demand that sellers cure the defect.3 7 In contrast, risks
contained in the specific exceptions, although likewise not
insured against, do provide the contracting parties with knowl-
edge of specific title flaws. This knowledge, in turn, enables the
executory purchaser to negotiate with the seller the risk of loss
and demand cure or rescission if the seller fails to cure a major
defect.
It is true, however, that title insurance policies cover hidden
defects not discoverable by a reasonable search-those that pre-
vious assurance systems failed to address.3 8 Yet, only certain
risks are covered.39 Title policies exclude many off-record risks
such as labor liens and survey matters.'0 Because these exclu-
36. See note 35 supra and text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
37. See text accompanying notes 68-69 infra. See generally P. GOLDSTEIN, REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND TRANSFER, DEVELOPMENT AND
FINANCE 123-39, 165-68 (1980).
38. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
39. Johnstone notes that the more risky defects are usually explicitly excepted. See
Johnstone, supra note 3, at 494-97. See generally P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 37, at 200.
40. Id. at 497. Other standard exceptions include liens or encumbrances not found
in the public records, mechanic's liens, and matters of zoning. See Curtis, supra note 32,
at 3 n.11; Whitman, supra note 8, at 58 n.79; Comment, supra note 6, at 1172 nn.60 &
61. The Washington Land Title Association (WLTA) standard form policy provides gen-
eral exceptions for survey or encroachment matters, unrecorded easements, material or
labor liens, patent reservations, possession matters, water rights matters, and govern-
ment regulation of use, enjoyment, or occupancy. This list is not exclusive. See Hogan,
Selected Title Insurance Policies and Coverages, in REAL ESTATE AND THE GENERAL
PRACTITIONER 1, 7 (WSBA Section of Real Property, Probate & Trust Law ed. 1976).
Assumedly, a title insurer's efforts in tracking down some of these excluded matters
would prove uneconomical.
The new ALTA Residential Title Insurance Policy (1979) eliminates some of the
above exceptions. However, it still excludes building and zoning ordinances, laws gov-
erning land use (unless the land cannot be used for a single-family residence), land
improvements, land division, and environmental protection. It also excludes from cover-
age circumstances requiring removal of boundary walls and fences. See Bowling, Recent
Significant Developments, TITLE INSURANCE: SPECIAL PROSLEMS 17 (Practicing Law Inst.
ed. 1980). Washington title insurers, at the time this piece went to publication, have not
yet used the ALTA Residential Title Insurance Policy, nor is there any indication
whether the title industry in Washington will adopt it in toto.
Even if the title policy did not list within its general exceptions these non-record
risks, facts indicating the possibility of such off-record risks resulting in loss would likely
compel the insurer to exclude specifically the questionable off-record matter. Ring, Title
Insurance For The Owner - Or What You See Is Not Necessarily What You Get, 52
L.A. B.J. 20, 21-24 (No. 1, July, 1976) ("if the title company's investigation discloses
facts that would indicate the existence of any of these non-record deEcts, it will except
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sions obviate the title company's need to search for such mat-
ters, they may leave both the buyer and seller unprotected. The
weaknesses of title insurance led one commentator to describe it
as a "snare and a delusion[,] for many policies written today
exclude from coverage the very risks that a vendee desires
insured. ' '41
To understand how a duty upon title insurers to search and
disclose title defects can alleviate these infirmities, 4' a brief
that specific item from the coverage of the policy.").
41. Roady, Professional Liability of Abstracters, 12 VAND. L. REv. 783, 794 (1959).
Another criticism leveled against the title industry attacks its tendency to act as a
barrier to land conveyancing reform:
Title insurance was conceived of in an effort to meliorate some of the worst of
[the weaknesses of the conveyancing process]. But it is designed to keep the
patient alive, not to cure him, and has the inherent vice that it institutionalizes
existing ills. It should not be treated as creating a vested interest in the ineffi-
ciencies of the land records. The public requires, to the contrary, that means
be devised to make conveyancing more efficient and more certain. The very
existence of title insurance stands in the way of such an objective.
Payne, The Restoration of Conveyancing, 15 ALA. L. REv. 371, 387 (1963). See also
Brossman & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 442. Others argue that all insurance companies
operating title plants in the same area should consolidate to avoid high costs and need-
less duplication. Whitman, supra note 8, at 60-63. Another commentator sees three types
of criticism of the title business: (1) lack of effective state regulation of title industry
rates; (2) failure of the marketplace adequately to regulate title insurance because of the
title industry's oligopolistic nature; and (3) the suspect nature of the relationship
between title insurers and institutional lenders. Quiner, supra note 10, at 721-23.
42. Comprehension of the nature of title insurance and the desirability of imposing
a duty upon title insurers to search and disclose title defects necessarily entails an
understanding of four basic concepts: search, disclosure, insurability, and marketability.
To illustrate the distinctions between these terms, assume that a buyer B wishes to
purchase certain property from S. The property, however, is subject to a local assessment
on the property to be paid in annual installments over a 40-year period. S has paid the
first four installments. S conveys the property to B.
Search is the procedure where the title insurer, before issuing a policy, looks
through the records to discover title defects, liens, and encumbrances. If it fails to dis-
cover the assessment, neither the title insurer nor B becomes aware of its existence. This
omission may be a breach of the duty to search, but not of the duty to disclose.
Disclosure is a different situation. Assume the title insurer searches the records, dis-
covers the assessment, but fails to inform B of its existence. Here the title insurer is
aware of the defect, but B is not. The insurer may have breached the duty to disclose,
but it has not breached the duty to search. The insurer might fail to disclose here
because the assessment is the type of item that falls within the policy's general excep-
tions. For the same reason, an insurer might fail to search for such a risk. In either case,
B cannot negotiate with S regarding the risk of loss and, therefore, the disclosure func-
tion of the title policy is not served. A different result follows if the insurer specifically
had excepted the assessment from coverage. This disclosure via the specific exception
enables B to avoid or negotiate the risk with S prior to closing (or require S's cure, waive
S's cure, or allow B's rescission of the centract, if the assessment renders title
unmarketable).
Insurability is illustrated where the insurer searches the record, uncovers the assess-
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examination of the case law in Washington is instructive. The
Washington Supreme Court declined to impose such a duty on
Washington title insurers in Shotwell v. Transamerica Title
Insurance Company.43 In Shotwell, plaintiffs discovered a forty-
foot-wide right-of-way transecting their river front property.
Prior to plaintiffs' purchase of the tract in 1974, Transamerica
issued a preliminary commitment for title insurance, agreeing
to issue its policy to plaintiffs subject to certain exceptions. The
ment, weighs the actuarial possibilities of the risk becoming a loss, decides whether to
assume or exclude the risk, and perhaps adjusts the premium accordingly. Here the
insurer likely would declare the existence of the lienable assessment and exclude it from
policy coverage. By so doing, however, it has informed B of the assessment's existence. B
can then negotiate with S to deduct the unpaid assessment installments from the
purchase price at closing. If, however, the assessment falls within an area of risk included
in the policy's general exceptions and the insurer thereby decides not to except it specifi-
cally, B, lacking knowledge, is thereby denied an opportunity to reject title or negotiate a
different price.
Marketability is the concept that the title, in contrast to being merely insurable, is
"reasonably free of reasonable doubt." Wilson v. Korte, 91 Wash. 30, 32, 157 P. 47, 49
(1916); accord, Colpe v. Lindblom, 57 Wash. 106, 106 P. 634 (1910). Marketability,
unlike insurability, connotes curative action and trouble-free ownership. Washington law
presumes that S will convey marketable title. See text accompanying note 70 infra.
Thus, assuming that the assessment renders the title unmarketable, B can demand that
S cure the defect and, if S fails to do so, opt out of the contract with impunity. The
Washington Supreme Court succinctly highlighted the insurability-marketability dichot-
omy in Hebb v. Severson, 32 Wash. 2d 159, 201 P. 2d 156 (1948):
[Elven though a title be insurable, it does not follow, necessarily, that the
title is also good or marketable. It cannot be gainsaid that any title, no matter
how defective, is, from a practical standpoint, insurable, if the premium rate be
set high enough, or the list excepting defects which are not insured against be
long enough. Therefore, to say that a title is insurable merely means that it is
capable of being insured, and not that it is also good or marketable.
This hypothetical is based on the case of Mayers v. Van Schaick, 268 N.Y. 320, 197
N.E. 294 (1935). In Mayers, the certificate of title insurance made no mention of the
local assessment. The court held that the title company had not agreed to protect the
purchaser against liability for the unpaid assessment because the assessment was not a
lien at the time of the policy. A strong dissent stated:
Title insurance policies are intended to inform the purchaser of any
defects in the title, claims against or burdens or requirements on the property.
Unless defects or objections are noted, at least in the exceptions, the policy
becomes valueless. An assessment levied against the property, although not a
lien nor payable until the future, is clearly a burden on the property concern-
ing which the purchaser seeks information. To hold that although objections to
a title are not noted either by way of exception or otherwise, those insuring the
title are not liable, is to render useless title insurance.
Id. (Finch, J., dissenting).
43. 91 Wash. 2d 161, 588 P.2d 208 (1978).
44. A preliminary commitment for title insurance is the same as a preliminary title
report. See Pioneer National Title Insurance Co. (PNTI), What is Title Insurance?,
MESSAGE, May 1973, at 2, 4. It has been held that a preliminary title report is equivalent
to a title abstract. 9 J. APPI mm, supra note 16, § 5213 at 50.
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policy insured against "loss or damage sustained by reason of
. . . [a]ny defect in, or lien, or encumbrance on, said title"'"
except those listed, one of which was "right of way for existing
roads."" Although the right-of-way was a matter of public
record,7 Transamerica failed to advise plaintiffs of its existence
even though a reasonable search would have revealed it. The
Shotwells sued Transamerica for damages,' 8 asserting the policy
covered this condition. The trial court, however, held for the
defendant, and plaintiffs appealed."
The court of appeals considered and resolved sua sponte
the question of duty. Emphasizing the reasonable expectations
of the land buyer and the interlocking of title insurance and title
searches, the appellate court held that a title company has a
duty to conduct reasonable searches for title defects and to
45. 91 Wash. 2d at 163, 588 P.2d at 208. A typical policy provides that "TITLE
COMPANY does hereby insure against loss or damage sustained by reason of any defect
in, or lien or encumbrances on said title existing at the date hereof, not shown in Sched-
ule B," the list of exceptions. Thus, if a defect occurs that is not excluded in the policy,
the purchaser can sue on the contract if the title company fails to pay upon demand.
E.g., Kiniski v. Archway Motel, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 555, 586 P.2d 502 (1978); Securities
Serv., Inc. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 20 Wash. App. 664, 583 P.2d 1217 (1978).
46. In addition to this specific exception, the relevant general exception clauses
read:
1.... public or private easements, streets, roads, alleys or highways, unless
disclosed of record by . . .decree of a court of record ...
2 .... rights or claims based upon instruments or upon facts not disclosed by
the public records but of which rights, claims, instruments or facts the insured
has knowledge.
91 Wash. 2d at 163, 588 P.2d at 208.
47. A Clallan County court decree established the right-of-way in 1944.
48. It is unclear what measure of damages plaintiffs sought. Plaintiffs' brief states
that "[p]laintiffs sued to recover under a title insurance policy for losses resulting from
existence of an undisclosed county right-of-way across plaintiffs' property." Brief of
Appellants at 2, Shotwell v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 16 Wash. App. 627, 558 P.2d
1359 (1976). But plaintiffs-appellants' reply brief states that "the marketability of that
portion of their [plaintiffs'] property is seriously impaired." Appellants' Reply Brief at 7.
Thus, it appears that plaintiffs sought the difference between the fair market value of
the land with and without the easement. Plaintiffs sought $50,000 on an $85,000 policy.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2-3, Shotwell v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co.,
No. 22385 (Super. Ct. Clallam County, June 13, 1975).
49. Plaintiffs argued that policy language excepting "right of way for existing roads"
excluded from coverage only the ten-foot-wide visible road that was much narrower and
shorter than the public right-of-way. The trial court held that the "policy of title insur-
ance issued by the Defendant to the plaintiffs specifically excepted the right of way for
the existing public road. . . as a 'defect, lien or encumbrance' which the Defendant did
not insure." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4, Shotwell v. Transamerica
Title Ins. Co., No. 22385 (Super. Ct Clallam County, June 13, 1975).
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advise applicants of any impediments the search uncovers."0 The
court also relied on the Washington statute requiring title insur-
ers to maintain tract indices"1 and recognized that title insur-
ance is designed to delineate and prevent, rather than assume,
risk of loss.52
Unlike the court of appeals, the Washington Supreme Court
left open the duty issue. The court instead reviewed the title
policy as it would review any other insurance policy, construing
ambiguities against the insurer and adopting the construction
most favorable to the insured.58 Inquiring as to the average per-
son's"5 interpretation of the policy, the court found it "hard to
believe that an average person purchasing this type of insurance
would contemplate that a 40-foot right-of-way extending over
his entire property would have been excluded from policy cover-
age." 5  The court held that the policy was ambiguous as a matter
of law and that the exclusionary phrase "right of way for
existing roads" embraced only visible roads, not a partially
invisible right-of-way.5 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the policy covered the flaw on the title arising from the county
right-of-way, thereby affirming the court of appeals' reversal and
remand to determine damages.
In choosing to resolve the Transamerica appeal by contract
analysis, the supreme court avoided the issue of Transamerica's
duty to search and disclose title defects.58 Although conceding
50. 16 Wash. App. at 631, 558 P.2d at 1361 (1976).
51. Id. See text accompanying notes 86-89 infra.
52. See text accompanying note 79 infra. It is unclear whether the court of appeals
imposed a duty based on implied contract or tort. See text accompanying notes 137-55
infra.
53. 91 Wash. 2d at 168-69, 588 P.2d at 212. This rule of construction presupposes
unequal bargaining power. See J. CALAMARI & J. PwuLuo, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3-11
(2d ed. 1977) ("This rule applies with particular force in a case of a standardized con-
tract and in a case in which the drafting party had a stronger bargaining position."). Id.
at 122 n.40.
54. The term "average person" requires no definition because its meaning is com-
monly understood. See State v. Jungclaus, 176 Neb. 641, 126 N.W.2d 858 (1964).
55. 91 Wash. 2d at 169, 588 P.2d at 212.
56. The court was referring to a road that was narrower and shorter than the court-
decreed right-of-way. See note 49 supra.57. 91 Wash. 2d at 170, 588 P.2d at 213. The court found another ambiguity in the
exclusion "right of way for existing roads" by contrasting that exclusion with the general
exception which excluded "public . . .easements, streets, roads ... unless disclosed of
[public] record." Id. at 167, 588 P.2d at 212. See note 46 supra. The court read the
general exception to imply negatively that if such easements or roads were disclosed by
public record, they fell within policy coverage. 91 Wash. 2d at 167, 588 P.2d at 212.
58. The parties had not raised the issue. However, judges faced with novel and nota-
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that the combination of consumer expectations and the services
title companies actually provide may warrant a duty to search
and disclose," the court declined to impose a duty because the
parties did not brief the issue and because the court found an
alternative basis for its decision.10 The court's dictum leaves
unclear whether the court will impose a duty when the occasion
properly presents itself. The Shotwell dictum also fails to reveal
whether the supreme court would adopt a tort or an implied
contract theory if it imposed a duty.s1
The duty issue, then, is an open question in Washington. An
analysis of whether courts ought to impose such a duty should
focus initially on the typical real estate transaction. The average
home buyer usually completes an Earnest Money Receipt and
Agreement (EMRA) form with the seller. In the EMRA form,
the seller promises "title . . . to be free of encumbrances, or
defects" except those specifically listed.'3 The EMRA form also
lists general exceptions, including federal patents, state deeds,
building or use restrictions general to the district, building or
zoning regulations, and existing easements not inconsistent with
the buyer's intended use.' 8 The seller is obligated to provide title
insurance prior to closing, and thus, delivery of the policy or
preliminary title report is a condition precedent to the buyer's
ble societal issues should not lightly decline review. Justice Cardozo believed that courts
should engage in a balancing approach, weighing the social interest in precedent against
the social interest "served by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare. This
may enjoin upon the judge the duty of drawing the line at another angle, of staking the
path along new courses, of marking a new point of departure from which others who
come after him will set out upon their journey." B. CAsDOzo, NATURE op THE JuDICIAL
PRocEss 112-13 (1922).
59. "We recognize such a duty might arise from the combined expectations of a title
policy applicant and the service to be performed by title insurance companies." 91 Wash.
2d at 165, 588 P.2d at 211.
60. Thus, Shotwell does not stand for the proposition that failure to search and
disclose is not actionable in tort or that there is no implicit duty to search and disclose.
In fact, the supreme court cites more authorities supporting a duty than does the court
of appeals. The court merely found it "unnecessary" to reach this issue. 91 Wash. 2d at
170, 588 P.2d at 213. The consumer public must now wait for another case to climb the
time-consuming ladder of appellate review to discover what the supreme court will do.
61. It seems clear that title insurers will not insert express contract clauses imposing
a duty to search. Thus, the two sources for judicial imposition remain (1) implied con-
tractual duty and (2) tort duty arising from the parties' relationship and the disparity
between the consumer's reasonable expectation and what the title industry actually pro-
vides. See Comment, supra note 6, at 1167.
62. See Falconer, Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement, in RzAL ESTATE AND THE
GENERAL PRAcTmoNzR supra note 40, at 221.
63. Id. at 222-24, 247-48.
University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 4:212
duty to perform.6 4 As a general practice, the realtor orders the
title insurance as the seller's agent, and the seller, rather than
the buyer, pays the premium.1 If the buyer is also applying for a
loan, a mortgagee title insurance policy to protect the lender is
also required; however, the buyer, not the lender, pays for the
mortgagee policy.6 If the title is not insurable,"' the seller must
return the earnest money unless the buyer waives the defects"
or the seller cures them." Even if the contract is silent as to title
quality, Washington law presumes the seller to convey "good or
marketable" title.70 Thus, the disclosure of defects to the pur-
chaser is paramount in the executory contract phase prior to
closing. Absent adequate disclosure, the executory purchaser
cannot avoid or negotiate title risks or pursue other alternatives
such as waiver, cure, and rescission.
The arguments for and against establishment of a duty also
require familiarity with the typical title insurance policy. The
face of Washington Land Title Association's (WLTA) standard
form policy includes the insuring agreement, which provides
basically that the insurer is liable for loss or damage due to
defects, liens, or encumbrances except those specifically or gen-
64. Kolosoff v. Turri, 27 Wash. 2d 81, 176 P.2d 439 (1947). See Falconer, supra note
62, at 228.
65. See Falconer, supra note 62, at 228. Sometimes, though, the buyer must apply
for title insurance himself if he desires coverage. See Johnstone, supra note 3, at 494.
Most real estate transactions involve realtors. See generally Raushenbush, supra note
11, at 204.
66. The realtor customarily sends the paperwork to the lender or escrow agent and
orders the loan and owner policies at the same time. Interview with Betty Olson, Realtor,
in Bellevue, Washington, Feb. 13, 1980.
67. Paragraph 2 of the EMRA provides inter alia:
The title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those pro-
vided for in said standard form plus encumbrances or defects noted in Para-
graph 1 above. Delivery of such policy or title report to closing agent. . . shall
constitute delivery to purchaser. If title is not so insurable as above provided
and cannot be made so insurable by [the] termination date ... earnest money
shall be refunded and all rights of purchase terminated. Provided that pur-
chaser may waive defects and elect to purchase.
Falconer, supra note 62, at 248 (copy of EMRA). According to Falconer, this clause
is misleading and should instead read: "If a report or policy of insurance cannot be
issued with no encumbrances and defects except those set forth in paragraph 1 ... "
Id. at 228.
68. See EMRA in id. at 247-48.
69. Negotiation is always possible to determine which party will bear certain risks.
Interview, supra note 66. See Falconer, supra note 62, at 225.
70. See Falconer, supra note 62, at 225. This duty to convey marketable title can be
altered contractually. See id. at 225, 248. The policy behind the marketable title pre-
sumption is that no one should have to buy a lawsuit. See note 42 supra.
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erally excepted."' Schedule A of the WLTA policy contains the
policy'o subject matter.7 Schedule B lists all the specific defects,
encumbrances, and liens discovered of record that are excluded
from coverage.7 8 Schedule B also sets forth printed general
exceptions 4 such as encroachments, boundary questions, federal
patents, limitation by government regulation regarding subdivi-
sion, use, enjoyment, or occupancy, defects known to the
insured, prohibition on the use or improvement of land, general
taxes not yet payable, and noncompliance with consumer credit
laws.75 The WLTA title insurance policy significantly lacks any
reference to insurer's negligence or even a title search.
Judicial imposition of a duty upon title insurers to conduct
reasonable searches and to disclose results to land purchasers
should help eliminate the weaknesses of title insurance. Several
reasons support establishment of such a duty. First, because
title insurance evolved from other title assurance methods predi-
cated on title searches 7 6 title insurers do in fact conduct title
searches as a general practice. 7 When insurers issue preliminary
commitments or title reports, they have impliedly undertaken a
title search despite the absence of any express policy provision
requiring a search7a Furthermore, title insurance differs from
71. The period of coverage differs for the type of insured: if the insured is a lender,
it continues as long as the mortgage or deed of trust is a lien on the property; if the
insured is a purchaser-owner, it continues until sale or other disposal. See Hogan, supra
note 40, at 5.
72. E.g., policy limits, policy number, date, premium, insured's name, the interest
insured, and a legal description. Id. at 5, 22.
73. E.g., mortgages, recorded liens, easements, and other defects uncovered in the
search. Id. at 23.
74. Id. at 5-7. See note 40 supra (listing examples of such general exceptions).
75. The EMRA general exceptions parallel many title policy exceptions. See Hogan,
supra note 40, at 5-7, 16, 25, and text accompanying note 63 supra. The ALTA Residen-
tial Title Insurance Policy exceptions include violations of building and zoning regula-
tions, title risks created or agreed to by insureds, and lack of rights in streets, alleys, or
waterways that touch the insured's land. See Bowling, supra note 40, at 570.
76. See text accompanying notes 9-15 supra. As previously indicated, title insurance
emerged to remedy the inefficiencies of the abstract system. The abstract system, in
turn, evolved from the lawyer's opinion method. Because the abstract method relies on
lawyers, the two are quite similar.
77. See, e.g., Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 938, 122
Cal. Rptr. 470, 485 (1975); Shotwell v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 16 Wash. App. 627,
631, 558 P.2d 1359, 1361 (1976); P. BAsyz, supra note 2, § 3; PNTI, supra note 44, at 2.
78. Contra, Hawkins v. Oakland Title & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 127, 331
P.2d 742, 748 (1958) (no express or implied representation that defects listed are exclu-
sive); see Banville v. Schmidt, 37 Cal. App. 3d 92, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1974) (relying on
RESTATEMENT op ToRTs § 552 (1938) in holding insurer liable for negligent misrepresen-
tation in issuing erroneous preliminary commitment it knew buyer would rely upon).
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casualty insurance in that title insurance stresses loss preven-
tion, not risk assumption.7' This focus on loss prevention high-
lights the function of title policies or preliminary title reports in
real estate transactions. By excluding specifically from coverage
those defects disclosed by the company's search, the insurer
thereby informs the executory purchaser of potential title
defects; the now knowledgeable executory purchaser may negoti-
ate the risk with the seller or, in appropriate circumstances,
demand cure, waive cure, or rescind the contract.80 Thus, it is
clear that insurers can prevent loss only by conducting searches
to find potential defects. The duty to search and disclose would
require only that such searches be reasonably mades and the
American Land Title Association (ALTA) owner policies, WLTA standard form pol-
icies, and ALTA Residential Policy (1979) are silent on the "searching" issue. ALTA
owner policies may be found in TrriT INSURANCE IN MAJOR REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS,
supra note 3, at 349, and B. STONE, MODERN LEGAL FORMS, §§ 24.1, 25.1 (Supp. 1980).
ALTA adopted these forms in 1970. See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
79. Title insurance generally is not written on a casualty basis, and, conversely, cas-
ualty insurance is not designed to prevent future loss. PNTI, supra note 44, at 2; Robin-
son, Title Insurance and the Hairdresser, TrriLE NEws, April 1979, at 18. In fact, the loss
payouts and adjustments for title insurance constitute only about 4% of the amount
collected in premiums. In Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp.
564 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the court stated:
The investigation of the risk of loss prior to deciding whether to insure that
risk is clearly part of the business of insurance. Anyone.. . knows that the
cost of this investigation, which generally involves . . . the maintenance of a
title plant, far exceeds the actuarial cost of the losses incurred....
[I]nvestigation ... becomes more important than the actual insurance protec-
tion .... [I]t is a substitute for the risk.
Id. at 574.
80. See text accompanying notes 37 and 68-69 supra.
81. Although courts would determine the scope of a reasonable search, they should
consider the information available to title insurers in their title plants. Thus, the starting
point of inquiry would be WASH. AD. CODE § 284-16-030 (1977), defining what the legisla-
ture meant when it required title insurers to maintain a "complete set of tract indexes."
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 48.29.020, .040 (1979). See note 83 infra.
The Washington Administrative Code defines tract indices as "a set of indexes from
which the record ownership and condition of title to all land within the... county can
be traced and ascertained, such set of indexes to be complete from the inception of title
from the United States of America." WASH. An. CODE § 284-16-030(1) (1977). The title
company must maintain not only tract indices for judicial proceedings and recorded doc-
uments affecting title to particular property and imparting constructive notice, but also
name indices for matters affecting title to all real property of the person or entity named
in the instruments. Id.
In conformity with the administrative agency requirements, a court could define a
reasonable search to encompass any defects that would render the title unmarketable,
including all matters of record such as tax liens, easements, judgments, mortgages,
mechanic's liens, material liens, unexpired leases, and other matters such as building
code violations and restrictive covenants if the insurer has or should have knowledge of
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results thereof reasonably revealed.82
Judicial establishment of a duty to search and disclose
would also further the goals of Washington's statutory scheme
pertaining to title insurers. Three sets of such statutes exist,
designed primarily to protect the public in dealing with title
insurers. The statutes that protect the public from unfair prac-
tices of insurance companies, including title companies, are the
most obvious.83 Second, legislation passed in 1979 requires com-
panies such as banks, credit unions, and title insurers to give
written notice to parties involved in property sales and loans
that the documents may affect their legal rights and that they
should consult a lawyer if they have questions.84 Although the
act does not cover title insurance policies,85 its intent with
respect to the notice requirement is public protection.
them. The court also might have to invalidate policy exceptions in the process of defin-
ing a reasonable search.
82. Both lawyers and abstracters are held to a standard of reasonable care. As dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 137-48 infra, the similarity between title insurance
and the abstract and lawyer's opinion methods of title assurance justifies imposition of a
similar standard of care.
Although courts holding title insurers liable for negligent searches generally limit
the scope of reasonableness to documents discoverable within the official chain of title
rather than tract indices, see Curtis, supra note 32, at 4, one court found negligence in
failing to disclose a document in the insurer's file. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Ram-
sey, 507 P.2d 492 (Alaska 1973).
Title insurers can reasonably reveal the results of title searches simply by informing
the insured of any defect that may materially affect property value. This requirement,
therefore, goes to both form and substance. See notes 116 & 128.
83. The state code prohibits persons engaged in the insurance business from using
unfair methods of competition or engaging in deceptive acts or practices and authorizes
the insurance commissioner to promulgate regulations in accordance therewith. WASH.
REv. CODE § 48.30.010 (1979). See WASH. AD. CODE §§ 284-30-300 to -410 (Supp. 1978)
(commissioner's regulations). California's chief deputy insurance commissioner specifi-
cally warned the title industry in California to read the state's Unfair Trade Practices
Act because it applied to them, particularly in regard to handling claims. McNitt, A
Regulator's View of the Title Industry, TrrlE NEws, Dec. 1977, at 7, 12. One could argue
that title insurers are engaging in an unfair trade practice because the actual practice of
the industry does not comport with the expectations of the average purchaser who relies
on the preliminary commitment (ordered by the seller) in purchasing property.
84. 1979 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 107 § 1 (codified as WASH. REv. CODE §
19.62.010 (West Supp. 1980)). The impetus for this legislation came from the realty and
lending industries who think non-lawyers should be allowed to prepare routine docu-
ments. Question looms over who legally can prepare routine documents, The Seattle
Times, October 5, 1980, F at 2, col. 1.
85. The documents covered by the act are "limited to deeds, promissory notes,
deeds of trust, mortgages, security agreements, assignments, releases, satisfactions,
reconveyances, contracts for sale. . . .and bills of sale. ... 1979 Wash. Laws 1st Ex.
Sess. ch. 107 § 1(2).
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Imposition of a duty to search and disclose would also com-
port with the third type of public protection legislation: the
requirement that title insurers maintain complete sets of tract
indices."6 Compliance with this statute means that Washington
title insurers operate as title plants containing, at the minimum,
duplicates of all the recorded encumbrances affecting title to
property within the county. 7 Furthermore, by defining title
insurance as "insurance of owners of property . . . against loss
by . . .defective titles . . . and services connected therewith,""
the legislature impliedly sanctioned recognition of a duty rea-
sonably to search and disclose. The fact that tract indexing
tends to offer greater protection because of its superiority to
traditional indexing systems s' also bolsters the inference that
such a duty is congruent with the legislative scheme to protect
the public."
A legal obligation to search and disclose would not only con-
form to statutory regulation of title insurers and the prevailing
practice of the industry to conduct title searches, but also is in
keeping with the very definition and purpose of title insurance
as expressed by courts,91 commentators, 2 and the title industry
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.29.020 (1979).
87. A title company normally carries out its own independent searches. See Payne,
The Why, What, and How of Uniform Title Standards, 7 ALA. L. REv. 25, 27 (1954);
Comment, supra note 6, at 1164; notes 20 & 81 supra.
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.11.100 (1979) (emphasis added).
89. The grantor-grantee index in the public recording system is inferior to the tract
index in organization and expediency in searching. The tract index is not inherently
superior but works better in practice. See notes 19-20 supra.
90. The remainder of chapter 48.29 protects the public by requiring title insurers to
make a guaranty fund deposit, maintain a special reserve fund, and not charge excessive
rates. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 48.29.010-.140 (1979).
91. See text accompanying notes 94-95 infra. See generally Transamerica Title Ins.
v. Ramsey, 507 P.2d 492 (Alaska 1973); First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Casper, 96 Cal. App.
3d 282, 157 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1979); Banville v. Schmidt, 37 Cal. App. 3d 92, 112 Cal. Rptr.
126 (1974); Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 331 P.2d
742 (1958); Pierson v. Bill, 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939); Pruett v. Mississippi Valley
Title Ins. Co., 271 So. 2d 920 (Miss. 1973).
92. E.g., P. BAsYE, supra note 2, at 14 ("Most title insurance is... based upon.
a careful search of the record."); Brossman & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 443 ("The
principal function of the commercial title insurer is twofold: to delineate. . . defects...
by the performance of a title examination and, based upon the results of this examina-
tion, to issue a policy . . . ."); Johnstone, supra note 3, at 494 ("Title [insurance com-
bines] a thorough title examination with the insurance of losses from some potential
defects."); Quiner, supra note 10, at 715 ("Prior to the issuance of [the] binder [or pre-
liminary commitment], the title company will make a very thorough investigation of the
records and documents affecting the title in question."). See generally BROWDER, supra
note 35, at 941-43, 953.
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itself."8 For instance, one Washington court defined title insur-
ance as "a guaranty of the accuracy of a company search and
record title on a specific property."" It is said to be "more than
a mere contract of indemnity": "[T]he very purpose . . . of the
title insurance transaction is to obtain a professional title search,
opinion and guarantee." The industry defines its primary func-
tion as loss prevention, not pure risk assumption, thus distin-
guishing title insurance from other types of insurance."
A duty to search and disclose would provide additional con-
sumer protection now lacking in title insurance. The average
home buyer incurs a substantial debt and invests the majority of
his life savings in buying a home.97 Yet, in the usual real estate
transaction, the vendor, not the vendee, applies and pays for the
title policy, leaving the vendee at most a third-party benefi-
ciary.98 Recognizing the precariousness of the vendee's position,
some courts have invoked the doctrine of negligent misrepresen-
tation to hold title insurers liable for negligent search and dis-
closure.9 9 The Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 552,
93. According to ALTA, the primary purpose of title insurance is to eliminate risks:
therefore, "title insurance companies undertake a thorough search of all public records
affecting a title before issuing title insurance policies." ALTA, The Nature of and Need
for Title Insurance Services, I THE TITLE INDusTRY: WHrr PAPERS (1976), reprinted in
TITLE INSURANCE IN MAJOR REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, supra note 3, at 577, 581-83.
94. Kiniski v. Archway Motel, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 555, 560, 586 P.2d 502, 506
(1978).
95. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp. v. Research Loan & Inv. Corp., 361 F.2d 764, 767 (8th
Cir. 1966); accord, Pierson v. Bill, 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939). See Note, Title Guar-
anty Companies Are Subject to Suit by the Insured on the Title Insurance Contract
Although No Suit Has Been Filed Against the Insured and No Adverse Claimant Has
Taken Possession of the Property, 8 HOUSTON L. Rv. 580, 581 (1971) ("The nature and
purpose of today's title insurance is to insure and guarantee a title free of defects and to
relieve the insured of the burden of examining the public records to determine the condi-
tion of the title to the land.").
96. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
97. See Gaudio, Title Covenants for the Iowa Homeowner-Some Good News and
Much Bad News, 23 DRAKE L. Rev. 1 (1973).
98. See Comment, Title Searches: Tort Liability in California, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW.
257, 257 (1967). However, the buyer is the "named insured." Some courts do not even
address or recognize this privity problem, i.e., the fact that the seller pays for the title
insurance. Also, even if the purchaser, rather than the seller, applied for title insurance,
the WLTA policy limits actions to those based on the policy provisions. See note 105
infra. Thus, if a court upholds this exculpation clause, the buyer can never recover for
negligence in searching. See Hogan, supra note 40, at 25 (specimen WLTA policy).
99. See, e.g., De Zemplen v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 221 Cal. App. 2d 197, 34
Cal. Rptr. 334 (1963); Chun v. Park, 51 Hawaii 462, 462 P.2d 905 (1969); Williams v.
Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974) (holding Michigan abstracter liable to third-
party vendee). See generally Comment, supra note 98, at 257-64.
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imposes liability on a company that fails to exercise reasonable
care in obtaining or relating information for others' guidance in
business transactions if the recipient is reasonably foreseeable,
justifiably relies on the information, and suffers pecuniary
loss. 100 Because title companies know that land purchasers justi-
fiably rely on the title insurer's expertise in ascertaining the con-
dition and desirability of title, despite the fact that sellers cus-
tomarily order the policies,101  courts could invoke the
Restatement to impose liability for negligent search and
disclosure.
A duty to search and disclose would be consonant with the
average person's reasonable expectations. When the prospective
insured deals with title insurer, he expects to receive a profes-
sional title search, an opinion as to the title's status, and a guar-
antee that title is "good ' "1 subject to the exceptions stated. In
fact, the purchaser may be interested more in what the title
examination reveals than in the insurance itself.103 Significantly,
some jurisdictions require consideration of the insured's expec-
tations. A California court has stated:
In determining what benefits or duties an insurer owes his
insured pursuant to a contract of title insurance, the court may
not look to the words of the policy alone, but must also con-
sider the reasonable expectations of the public and the insured
as to the type of service which the insurance entity holds itself
out as ready to offer.1
Thus, the aggregate of consumer expectations-purchaser reli-
ance, the definition and purpose of title insurance, and the goal
of Washington's statutory scheme to protect the public in deal-
ing with the title industry-together with the historical founda-
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
101. See Comment, supra note 98, at 261.
102. McLaughlin v. Attorneys' Title Guar. Fund, 61 Il. App. 3d 911, 916, 378
N.E.2d 355, 359 (1978). "Good" title generally means marketable title. See Shotwell v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 16 Wash. App. 627, 631, 558 P.2d 1359, 1361 (1976) ("[A]
policyholder has a reasonable expectation that he will be advised of the specific impedi-
ments upon his land as revealed by a reasonable search. ... ). Marketability and insur-
ability are two distinct concepts. See note 42 supra.
103. Johnstone, supra note 3, at 494. This is so because the purchaser, prior to clos-
ing, has the opportunity to negotiate risks disclosed by the title search and thereby waive
or demand seller's cure of any major defects. The executory purchaser also can rescind
the contract if the seller fails to timely cure. See note 37 supra; text accompanying notes
68-69 supra.
104. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 941, 122 Cal. Rptr.
470, 487 (1975) (emphasis added).
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tions from which the title insurance method emerged, militates
the establishment of a duty reasonably to search and disclose.
Such a duty will be effective only if courts disallow insurer
exculpation. Courts faced with an exculpatory clause 05 should
consider whether enforcement of the clause will widen the gap
between the home buyer's expectations and the actual title pro-
tection provided.""s The standardness of the insurance policy
and particularly the uniform attempt at exculpation should con-
vince a court to thwart such efforts to relieve insurer liability. In
support of this view, some commentators have concluded that
the owner's policy, in contrast to the lender's policy, is essen-
tially an adhesion contract.10 7 An adhesion contract is defined as
a:
[sltandardized contract form offered to consumers of goods
and services on essentially a "take it or leave it" basis without
affording the consumer realistic opportunity to bargain and
under such conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the
desired product or services except by acquiescing in the form
contract. A distinctive feature. . . is that the weaker party has
no realistic choice as to its terms. "
In Washington, title insurance predominates over other methods
of title assurance ' "e and price competition is essentially nonexis-
tent.110 Accordingly, the average home buyer is effectively pre-
cluded from going elsewhere to obtain the kind of title assur-
105. WLTA's standard form policy provides: "All actions or proceedings against the
Company must be based on the provisions of this policy. Any other action or actions...
that the insured may have... against the Company with respect to services rendered in
connection with the issuance of this policy, are merged herein and shall be enforceable
only under the terms, conditions and limitations of this policy." See Hogan, supra note
40, at 25.
106. For an example of this gap, see Condo caper: Title insurance offers owner no
protection, Seattle Times, Sept. 3, 1980, § F at 2, col. 1, where the "policy did not guar-
antee good title or even that the building was a legal condominium."
107. Curtis, supra note 32, at 1; Johnstone, supra note 3, at 504; Quiner, supra note
10, at 721. The mortgage policy, in contrast, is not an adhesion contract because the
lender is a commercial entity able to deal with the insurer on an equal basis. See note
114 infra.
108. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 38 (5th ed. 1979).
109. In Seattle, Spokane, and Tacoma, title insurance is used almost exclusively; in
smaller metropolitan areas, title insurance comprises 90% of the title market. Report of
the Committee on Acceptable Titles to Real Property, PROC. A.B.A. SECTION REAL PROP.
PROB. & TRUST LAW 43, 52 (1953). See note 111 infra.
110. Quiner believes competition would lower prices. See Quiner, supra note 10, at
725, 730.
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ances he needs or from even knowing what he needs."' Although
one Washington insurer offers, at additional cost, an Owner's
Inflation Protection Endorsement up to a maximum of 150% of
the original policy coverage," title insurance still remains quan-
titatively and qualitatively inadequate. s
In addition to a judicial resolution, the adoption of adminis-
trative regulations could aid the average home buyer in dealings
with the billion-dollar title industry.114 The state insurance com-
missioner could promulgate regulations requiring title insurers
to offer certain additional coverage for reasonable prices.115 This
111. Before buyers go elsewhere, they must realize the necessity of finding more
protection. Yet most consumers lack knowledge as to title insurance, rates, real estate
transactions, and price competition. See id. at 725; cf. 9 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 16, §
5201, at 20 ("[b]lanket exclusions ... are wholly inconsistent with the protection which
the face of the policy purports to offer."); Curtis, supra note 32, at 1 ("The buyer almost
never obtains an independent examination of the title to the land he is purchasing since
he has been induced by long-standing custom to place his faith in a title insurance policy
containing numerous exceptions which he infrequently reads and seldom understands.");
Quiner, supra note 10, at 719 ("Attorneys have been forced to admit that it can be
inconvenient and even costly for a prospective real estate buyer to retain the services of
both an attorney to perform the abstracting and to give title opinions, and the title com-
pany to insure hidden risk.").
The argument that consumers could realistically turn to title abstracts in addition to
title insurance for added protection fails for several reasons. First, if the consumer
resides in Washington and seeks an abstracter by turning to the telephone directory's
yellow pages, they refer him or her to title insurers. Second, assuming the average con-
sumer recognizes the need for additional title assurance in buying real property, he will
essentially be paying for two title searches because the cost of title insurance encom-
passes searching expenses and overhead costs for title plant maintenance. Third, with
the same assumption, it would be both costly and inconvenient to order an abstract of
title. Fourth, once the consumer receives the title abstract, he quite possibly will have to
hire a lawyer to interpret it for him. See Quiner, supra note 10, at 721 ("Since a real
estate transaction is a large and infrequent undertaking for many people, they probably
have little knowledge of alternative forms of title protection.").
112. See Hogan, supra note 40, at 13, 33.
113. The new ALTA Residential Title Insurance Policy offers greater protection and
more readable language to consumers. Unfortunately, at the time this piece went to pub-
lication, it was not yet in use in Washington. See Bowling, supra note 40, at 17.
114. Unlike individual purchasers, institutional lenders bargain at arm's length with
title insurers. See, e.g., Howlett, Standard Forms and What's New, TILE Naws, Jan.
1974, at 23. This can be seen by a comparison of the ALTA loan policy (1970), which
covers material liens, with the standard ALTA owner's policy, which does not. Mortgagee
policies extend to insure assignees of the mortgagee, whereas owner policies usually do
not cover grantees of the insured. See R. POWELL, supra note 1, and VT 1032-33 and
Johnstone, supra note 3, at 495-96, for further comparisons of owner and mortgagee poli-
cies. See also C. FLICK, 1 ABSTRAcT AND TITLE PsACTICE §§ 191-212 (2d ed. 1958); R.
PATTON, 1 PATTON ON LAND TrrIzs § 41 (2d ed. 1957).
115. This writer suggests additional endorsements for: inflation equivalent to the
actual rate, not 150%; government liens; material and labor liens; survey findings;
unmarketability; and defects disclosed by inspection; and assignees of insured owners.
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would serve two purposes. First, it would inform the land buyer
of the existence of possible deficiencies in the policy as it stands.
Second, it would provide access to additional protection. The
commissioner could also mandate that the insurer notify the
insured of the availability of additional coverage without the
insured's request.116 The commissioner could, as well, require
title insurers reasonably to conduct title searches and reasonably
to disclose the results to home buyers, leaving it to the courts to
determine the scope of reasonableness. Either administrative or
judicial imposition of a duty would result in more diligent
searches and would encourage courts to prevent insurer
exculpation.
While compelling reasons exist to support judicial imposi-
tion of a duty to search and disclose, opponents of the duty may
advance several arguments against it. Adversaries might argue
that imposition of such a duty is a legislative, rather than judi-
cial, function. In Washington, title insurers could contend that
because the legislature has already enacted other laws regulating
the title industry,127 none of which explicitly establishes a duty,
the courts cannot act in this realm. To bolster this argument,
the title industry could point out that some state legislatures
have recently enacted statutes explicitly mandating reasonable
title searches prior to issuance of insurance policies. Alaska, for
example, enacted a statute in 1974 requiring that "[n]o policy or
contract of title insurance may be written until the title insur-
ance company conducts . ..a reasonable search and examina-
tion of the title and has made a determination of insurability in
accordance with its established underwriting practices."" 8 The
statute, however, makes no mention of a disclosure requirement.
Nine state legislatures essentially have said that title insurers
116. One problem with this solution is its assumption that home buyers will under-
stand the significance of certain defects or potential defects. Most home buyers do not
seek professional advice, instead relying on realtors and title insurers. Interview, supra
note 66. Yet, this problem also inheres in the reasonable search and disclosure solution:
it could possibly be alleviated by compelling disclosure, in plain English, of defects that
could materially affect property value. See McNitt, supra note 83, at 12. One writer
impliedly recognized the Washington home buyer's predicament in suggesting that a
buyer may wish to have the "seller provide more than the title insurer will insure" and
that lawyers representing purchasers should encourage them to make "informal inquiries
regarding the property at the local governmental departments." Falconer, supra note 62,
at 222, 246. For a discussion of who (buyer or seller) should pay for additional coverage,
see note 125 infra.
117. See text accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
118. ALAsKA STAT. § 21.66.170 (1979 Supp.).
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cannot operate until they conduct reasonable searches.' 1 '
Because these states found it necessary to be explicit about such
a duty, an adversary could argue that Washington's omission
amounts to denial of the duty.
Although this legislative function argument has superficial
appeal, closer examination reveals its weaknesses. First, assum-
ing that these statutes explicitly create a duty, the negative
pregnant argument relative to Washington's legislative scheme
fails to acknowledge that judicial imposition of a duty promotes
the purpose behind tract indexing and other statutory require-
ments to protect the public.1'0 Second, the mere fact that other
legislatures found time to deal with this problem does not mean
that Washington legislators are not operating under time con-
straints 21 or that the insurance lobby has not been effective.12 2
Third, other state courts' willingness to act in imposing a duty
to reasonably search and disclose evidences further the weakness
of the argument that courts must await legislative action. 12
Finally, these statutes have not explicitly created a duty to
119. Id; Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1567 (1956); COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-11-106
(1973); Nis. REv. STAT. § 44-1905 (1943); Nsv. Rzv. STAT. § 692A.220 (1977); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 416-A:6 (1979 Supp.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-132 (1975) (also requires an
attorney's opinion); OHIO REV. CODE Am. § 3953.07 (Page 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
910-7 (Purdon 1971); cf. Thx. INs. COD ANN. art. 9.34 (Vernon 1979 Supp.) (requires
only "search of title ... from an abstract plant," omitting any requirement of a reasona-
ble search).
120. See text accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
121. See Wyman v. Wallace, 91 Wash. 2d 317, 322, 588 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1979)
(Utter, J., dissenting) (recognizing that present time constraints on modern legislatures
are such that they may act only upon the most compelling needs).
122. See generally Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of
Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. Rzv. 265, 281, 285, 291 (1963).
123. E.g., Banville v. Schmidt, 37 Cal. App. 3d 92, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1974) (tort
recovery allowed); Northwestern Title Sec. Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 85 Cal. Rptr.
693 (1970) (recovery allowed in either contract or tort, but under California's statutory
scheme the monetary recovery is the same); Viotti v. Giomi, 230 Cal. App. 2d 730, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (1964) (recognizing recovery for negligent search grounded in contract or tort);
Chun v. Park, 51 Hawaii 462, 462 P.2d 905 (1969) (recovery in tort for negligence);
Quigby v. St. Paul Title Ins. & Trust Co., 60 Minn. 275, 62 N.W. 287 (1895) (recovery in
tort allowed). But see Horn v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 89 N.M. 709, 557 P.2d 206 (1976)
(no duty, hence no recovery in tort); Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 537 S.W.2d 55
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (title company had no duty regarding title examination). See 9 J.
APPLzMA, supra note 16, § 5213, at 50 nn.4.65-4.90 (cases listed where duty was
imposed on title insurers), Curtis, supra note 32, at 1-29; Comment, supra note 6, at
1161-84 (policy considerations in finding a duty to search). See also Comment, supra
note 98, at 257, discussing expansion of title insurer's liability for breach of duty to
third-party purchasers in searching records.
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search that benefits home purchasers. 12' Accordingly, the legisla-
tive function argument cannot stand.
Title insurers also might contend that judicial imposition of
the duty will raise insurance premiums. Higher premiums could
follow from the greater duty and risk imposed on insurers and
from increased labor costs.' 25 This contention is unfounded,
though, because consumers already absorb the overhead cost of
recording land encumbrances 12 6 and computer systems are avail-
able to expedite the searcher's job."' The assertion that premi-
ums will rise because of a greater duty, and hence potentially
unlimited exposure to liability if a tort measure of damages is
applied, would have some merit if such a duty required insurers
to find, disclose, and explain all defects or potential defects. The
duty, however, does not encompass absolute disclosure; it merely
124. A close reading of these statutes can lead to the conclusion that these laws do
not benefit home buyers, but rather, insurers by preventing title insurance written on a
casualty basis. If the insurer fails to search, it is absorbing loss on a casualty basis. Thus,
companies issuing casualty insurance make no attempt to prevent loss by searching title
first. See Whitman, Home Transfer Costs: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 62 GEo.
L.J. 1311, 1348 (1974); Whitman, Transferring North Carolina Real Estate, Part H1:
Roles, Ethics and Reform, 49 N. CAROLINA L. Rzv. 593, 623-24 (1971). See also Ruem-
mele, Title Evidencing in North Dakota, 43 N. DAK. L. REV. 467, 483 (1967). Presuma-
bly, title insurers issuing policies without a prior search would threaten title insurers who
maintain title plants and pay searchers' salaries. Title insurers in Washington must
maintain title plants and, thus, the problem of title casualty insurance is academic.
Home buyers within states statutorily prohibiting issuance of title policies unless the
insurer conducts a reasonable search and makes a "determination of insurability" could
try to use these statutes to state a cause of action against the insurer for negligence in
searching title. They could argue that they are within the statute's protected class, see
W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 36 (4th ed. 1971), because legislators
know that buyers rely on insurers' preliminary title reports. Moreover, both society at
large and the insured are harmed by negligent searches or failure to search. See Payne,
supra note 13, at 439. Buyers benefit by ability to purchase real estate with some degree
of assurance; society, by stability in the land title market.
125. These are three possible remedies to this potential problem: regulation, compe-
tition, or state subsidization.
Assuming arguendo that premiums would rise, sellers forced to pay the premiums
might also object. In many real estate transactions, however, the seller plans to buy
another home and has tax inducements to do so. Thus any debate over the seller's objec-
tions is academic.
Further, sellers might object to paying for additional coverage through endorse-
ments. Sellers could argue that they might end up with a buyer who wants as much
protection as possible. Yet, when the seller too becomes a buyer, he also may want the
maximum protection. The problem is best resolved by local real estate practice.
126. The title search and examination account for the overwhelming majority of
costs incurred and revenues realized by title insurers. ALTA, supra note 93, at 584.
127. Ogasawara, Potential Benefits of Plant Automation Assessed, TrrLB NEws,
Aug. 1978, at 9: "Direct savings can be expected in the searching area."
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requires insurers to advise potential purchasers in advance of all
matters discovered in a reasonable search that might materially
affect the value of the property.12 8
The title industry might assert further that an actionable
duty to search would interfere with its right to contract.1' 9
Invoking the freedom of contract doctrine, insurers may contend
that the policies not only do not obligate them to search and
disclose 30 but also may relieve them contractually of any judi-
cially imposed liability.13s On close examination, however, the
freedom of contract doctrine in this context fails in its basic
premise that the parties bargained from relatively equal posi-
tions.' In fact, the insurer usually has access to far more infor-
mation than the insured, who generally must accept the insur-
ance policy on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.33 Thus, where the
parties are not bargaining at arm's length, the basis for the doc-
trine's application does not exist.
Countering this reasoning, title insurers also might argue
that the analysis of title policies as adhesion contracts is inap-
propriate because consumers would not want to bear the cost of
their insurer's increased liability through higher premiums.'"
This argument, however, ignores the fact that pecuniary inter-
128. Most importantly, the courts are suggesting that a title insurer has an
affirmative duty to disclose all defects or potential defects in title or be liable
for negligent abstracting. . . . If the title insurers are to be burdened with the
duty of disclosing and explaining all defects or potential defects, costs of title
insurance may substantially increase ...
The solution to this problem is simple . . . . Title insurers should merely
advise the prospective purchaser in advance of all matters-in the chain of
title or not-of which they are aware and which might materially affect the
value of the property.
McNitt, supra note 83, at 12.
129. Title insurers may fail if they argue constitutional impairment of a contract
right. See generally Comment, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey-State Promises
and the Contract Clause: An Untimely Resolution, 1 U. PUGET SD. L. REv. 299 (1978).
130. WLTA and ALTA owner and residential policies are silent as to a duty to
search. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
131. But see Viotti v. Giomi, 230 Cal. App. 2d 730, 41 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1964) (court
invalidating exculpatory clause of title insurer).
132. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PamLo, supra note 53, § 1-3: "Most of Contract
Law is premised upon a model consisting of two alert individuals, mindful of their self-
interest, hammering out an agreement by a process of hard bargaining."
133. See notes 107-14 supra. Generally, only sophisticated buyers or those who seek
legal representation in purchasing property know enough to negotiate for more expansive
coverage.
134. See text accompanying notes 125-28 supra, discussing "higher premium"
argument.
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ests are not the only interests at stake. For instance, society has
a centuries-old interest in efficient use of land and in assuring
clear, marketable title.1 3 5 Moreover, a prospective buyer who
knows the condition of title prior to purchase can better plan
the best use of the land. An insurer's duty to search and disclose
facilitates intelligent purchasing decisions by enabling buyers to
acquire as much title information as possible. This in turn fos-
ters the social policy of increased productivity and economic
growth."'
Once a court concludes that a duty to search and disclose is
warranted, its next task is to determine whether the obligation is
based in tort or contract law. The contract theory of liability is
founded on an analogy between title insurers and abstracters;1 s7
the tort theory, on an analogy between title insurers and law-
yers.13 8 These alternative bases for imposing liability follow from
the fact that lawyers' liability for professional negligence in
searching and examining the state of title is based generally on
tort law' while abstracters' liability for negligence in issuing
135. See Payne, Increasing Land Marketability Through Uniform Title Standards,
39 VA. L. REV. 1 (1953). See also Comment, Adverse Possession in Alabama, 28 ALA. L.
REV. 447, 451 (1977) (describes the importance of maximizing land usage as evidenced by
adverse possession statutes).
136. Comment, supra note 135, at 451.
137. See Roady, supra note 41, at 783; Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1122 (1970).
138. See Comment, Title Searches: The Potential for Liability, 49 Miss. L.J. 689
(1978); Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 1176 (1974).
Some courts holding that insurers have no duty to search and disclose focus on a
distinction between title insurers and abstract companies. The Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, in Tamburine v. Center Say. Ass'n, stated that there was a "vast difference"
between the two; that, because a title insurer is technically not an abstracter, it "owes no
duty with regard to the examination of title, thus precluding any recovery for negli-
gence." 583 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). In Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Pren-
dergast, 494 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1973), the Texas Supreme Court held that title insurance
is only a contract of indemnity and therefore no cause of action for negligence will lie for
failure to discover title defects prior to issuance of the policy. See also Note, supra note
95, at 580-86.
Accordingly, one difference between advocates and opponents of a duty to search
hinges on their views of title insurance's purpose and function. The industry maintains
that an insurer is not an abstracter, while proponents of the duty contend that insurers
have functions of both title abstracting and insuring. Indeed, one remarks that, under
such a restrictive view of title insurance, lawyers relying on title policies rather than title
abstracts would be committing malpractice. 9 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 16, § 5213, at 54
n.12.25. Appleman believes courts have a duty to enforce the parties' expectations, par-
ticularly when the industry leads parties, via advertising and practices, to rely on the
title policy as a guarantee of "good" title. He is highly critical of the Texas court's
approach. Id. § 5209, at 38 n.67.25, § 5213, at 55.
139. See note 138 supra.
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title abstracts traditionally has been grounded in contract law.140
Because the purpose of a preliminary commitment for title
insurance is to advise the intended insured of the proposed con-
tract terms,' and hence, list defects and encumbrances, title
insurance resembles both the abstract and the lawyer's opinion
methods. All three title assurance methods base their findings
on a search of the records under supervision of trained person-
nel. 42 Thus, some courts liken title insurers to abstracters,'4 3
others to lawyers.14 4
Regardless of whether an abstracter's or a lawyer's liability
rests in tort or in contract, the standard of care is essentially the
same. In 1879, the United States Supreme Court, in Savings
Bank v. Ward,'45 held that abstracters have a duty to exercise
reasonable care and skill in providing information regarding title
to real estate.' 4" Similarly, in a typical case, the Montana
Supreme Court in Clinton v. Miller147 held that an attorney
140. See note 137 supra.
141. See Haines, Claims Against a Title Insurer, in TITLE INSURANCE IN MAJOR
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, supra note 3, at 301, 324-27 (citing obligatory clause of
ALTA commitment).
142. See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
143. E.g., Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 938-39, 122
Cal. Rptr. 470, 485 (1975) (a title insurer acts as an abstracter when issuing a prelimi-
nary title report). Both the abstracter and insurer have a duty to "report all matters
which could affect his client's interests and which are readily discoverable from those
public records ordinarily examined when a reasonably diligent search is made." Id.
(quoting Contini v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d 536, 545-46, 115 Cal. Rptr.
257, 263 (1974)). See generally Comment, supra note 98, at 257.
144. See cases cited in 9 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5566, at 443-
44 & n.73 (1943). One difference between the two methods, though, is that title insurers
examine title only back to the date of the last policy issued, whereas lawyers under the
lawyer's opinion system reexamine the full abstract. Johnstone, supra note 3, at 508.
Also where title insurers operate as title plant companies, as in Washington, they use
their own storehouse of information rather than relying on the public records and indices
that lawyers use under the lawyer's opinion method. These differences, though, seem
insufficient to establish that title insurers are unlike lawyers who search and issue certifi-
cates, particularly in light of the persistent controversy between the organized bar and
title insurers regarding alleged unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., Payne, supra note
13, who notes:
When the central issue is other than unauthorized practice of law, the
courts show a much greater readiness to admit that title insurance companies
are, in fact, practicing law. . . . When liability has been imposed it has been
said that the company must be held to the same standard as an attorney.
Id. at 443-44. See generally Brossman & Rosenberg, supra note 3.
145. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
146. Id. at 205.
147. 124 Mont. 463, 226 P.2d 487 (1951). Accord, Hill v. Cloud, 48 Ga. App. 506, 173
S.E. 190 (1934); Watson v. Calvert Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 91 Md. 25, 45 A. 879, 881 (1900)
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owes a reasonable degree of care or skill and "to a reasonable
extent the knowledge requisite to a proper performance of his
duties ... ."Is Thus, a court obligating title insurers reasona-
bly to search and disclose should, consistent with the historical
roots of the title insurance method, adopt a standard requiring
that the insurer use a reasonable degree of skill and care.
In determining which theory of liability affords greater pro-
tection to the average purchaser, a court should consider such
factors as measure of damages, capacity to prove negligence or
breach of contract, and statute of limitations. Under a contract
theory of liability, plaintiffs could recover only those damages
not exceeding policy limits, 49 as opposed to tort damages proxi-
mately caused by insurer error.1 °0 On the other hand, a tort the-
ory may require a greater burden of proof because the plaintiff
must prove negligence rather than the contract theory's minimal
showing of the existence of a defect.' Furthermore, the statute
of limitations may be longer in contract than in tort.15 Although
these factors may favor a contract theory, insureds in Washing-
("reasonable degree of skill [and] diligence"); Hoppe v. Ranzini, 158 N.J. Super. 158, 385
A.2d 913 (1978); Bayerl v. Smyth, 117 N.J.L. 412, 189 A. 93, 95 (1937) ("An attorney
employed to examine a title to real property must exercise reasonable care and
skill. . . ."); Jacobsen v. Peterson, 91 N.J.L. 404, 103 A. 983, 984. (1918) ("ordinary care
and skill"). See AXELROD, supra note 19, at 816-17 (attorney's negligence).
148. 124 Mont. at 483, 226 P.2d at 498. See Comment, supra note 137, at 699-701
(attorney's liability for negligence in searching title).
149. The title insurance contract fixes the total amount of damages. See 0. BROW-
DER, R. CUNMNGHAM, J. JUuM & A. SMrr, BAsic Pnopmr LAW 955 (3d ed. 1979) ("pol-
icy ... obligates the insurer to pay all losses, up to a stated maximum"). It is unclear
whether a "reasonable contemplation of the parties" standard-the typical contract
measure of damages-would also limit the amount recoverable. See generally J.
CALAMAm & J. PmuuLo, supra note 53, § 14-4.
150. See W. PRossER, supra note 124, § 92. Proximate cause usually encompasses
more than what is "reasonably contemplated": "the damages recoverable for breach of
the contract duty are limited to those reasonably within the contemplation of the defen-
dant when the contract was made, while in a tort action, a much broader measure of
damages is applied." Id.
One court, holding a title insurer liable for negligence in failing to report an ease-
ment and in failing to defend, awarded damages of $200,000 although the policy limits
were only $75,000. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 470 (1975).
151. See Comment, supra note 6, at 1182-83 n.114 (discussing in detail the pros and
cons of tort versus contract regarding title insurance). See generally W. PRossER, supra
note 124, § 92 (delineating relative advantages and shortcomings of tort and contract).
152. Compare WASH. Rxv. CoDs § 4.16.040(2) (1979) (six-year statute of limitations
for actions based on written contract) with WASH. Rav. CODE § 4.16.080(3) (1979) (three-
year statute of limitations for tort actions). See generally W. PRossER, supra note 124, §
92 ("(In contrast to a contract action, a] shorter statute of limitations may bar the tort
action.").
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ton actually have a greater advantage in tort because of greater
flexibility in the accrual date of a cause of action. Traditionally,
the statute of limitations begins to run, both in tort and in con-
tract, when the lawyer or abstracter delivers the abstract or cer-
tificate of title. " ' The Washington Supreme Court, however, in
Peters v. Simmons,15 4 adopted the date-of-discovery rule for
lawyer negligence, holding that a malpractice cause of action
accrues when the defect is, or with reasonable care should have
been, discovered.' " Thus, a tort theory of liability for title insur-
ance actions better protects the buyer relying on the policy
because of the tort date-of-discovery rule and the possibility of
greater damages where the prospect of full proximate cause lia-
bility will motivate the insurer to diligently search title to keep
down the loss-payout ratio.
Judicial imposition of a tort duty, with an accompanying
negligence standard of care and tort measure of damages, can
best accomplish the goals of protecting the public in its dealings
with title insurers, promoting efficient use of land, and fostering
marketable titles and fluidity in real estate transactions.'" In
deciding whether to impose the duty on title insurers, courts
should look at the factors examined herein, including the rela-
tionship between the parties, the reasonable expectations of the
property buyer, the existence of legislation regulating the title
industry, the purpose and function of title insurance, and the
industry's historical origins. Consideration of these factors dic-
tates imposing an obligation of reasonable search and disclosure
on Washington title insurers.
Susan M. Stanley
153. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Crittenden Abstract & Title Co., 255
Ark. 706, 502 S.W.2d 100 (1973) (statute begins to run when abstract of title delivered).
See Roady, supra note 41, at 793. See also Douglas v. Title Trust Co., 80 Wash. 71, 141
P. 177 (1914) (abstract liability based on contract).
154. 87 Wash. 2d 400, 552 P.2d 1053 (1976).
155. Id.; cf. Hall v. San Jose Abstract & Title Co., 172 Cal. App. 2d 421, 342 P.2d
362 (1959); in Hall, a California court adopted the date of discovery rule for a cause of
action based on a title insurance policy even though the court based liability on breach
of contract rather than insurer negligence. Having found liability for breach of contract,
the court found it unnecessary to reach the negligence issue.
156. Hundreds of thousands of real estate transactions occur every year in Washing-
ton. See REAL ESTATE RESEARCH REPORT, spring 1979, at 23-27 app. (Seattle Real Estate
Research Comm. ed.); Realty Surge, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug. 13, 1978, § D, at 3,
col.4.
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